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Should Division I College Athletes Receive
Compensation in Excess of their Scholarships?
Trey Kilburg
ABSTRACT. This paper examines the amateurism debate that has surrounded collegiate
athletics since their inception in the 1800’s. The NCAA brings in enormous revenue from
Bowl Games and “March Madness” without paying the student-athletes who help generate
them. Large disparities in budgets and profits among Division I conferences and different
sports make it almost impossible for the NCAA to create a system that would fairly
compensate all student-athletes based on productivity. I conclude that student-athletes
should be able to accept endorsements deals that allow them to monetize their value
without costing students or colleges additional money.

I. Introduction
The NCAA generated $1 Billion in Revenue in 2017, and of that, $761
Million came from the NCAA men’s basketball tournament (Rovel 2018).
Massive revenue streams created by student-athletes have led some to
question the NCAA’s amateurism rules. Recent probes into college
basketball recruiting scandals by the Federal Bureau of Investigation have
renewed the conversation about the future of collegiate athletics
(Goodman 2018). This paper will briefly examine the history of college
sports and provide an analysis of the current NCAA landscape. My goal
is to give a fair description of both sides of the amateurism debate, and
provide my own opinion about what the best option is regarding NCAA
reform.

II. History of Collegiate Athletics
In 1636 Harvard became the first college founded in the American
Colonies. By 1860 there were over 200 colleges in the United States
(Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 1). Competition among colleges to
attract students rose as the number of colleges expanded. Prior to 1880,
Yale University was the only college in the United States to offer
graduate degrees (Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 3). Over time, the
demand for advanced study increased. This caused more colleges to offer
secondary degrees, which resulted in a need to hire a larger faculty.
Colleges needed to grow in order to support new courses in multiple
1

2

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2018

disciplines. Sports programs were used by many colleges as a way to
increase prestige and differentiate themselves from the competition
(Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 4).
Rowing was the first sport to have official contests between students
at different colleges (Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 5). The first
intercollegiate rowing event pitted Yale and Harvard against each other
on Lake Winnipesaukee in 1852 (Bernstein in Grant, Leadley and
Zygmont 2008, 6). The rowing events were so popular with spectators
that they were eventually moved to Saratoga, New York in subsequent
years (Bernstein in Grant, Leadly and Zygmont, 2008, 6).
The game of basketball was created by Dr. James Naismith in 1891
(National Center for Families Learning 2014). Naismith created the game
to provide an “athletic distraction” to a disruptive group of students that
he was working with as an employee of the Young Men’s Christian
Association (National Center for Families Learning 2014). Basketball
quickly gained national popularity as YMCA graduates spread the game
all over the country. The first collegiate game using five-player teams
took place in 1896, when the University of Chicago defeated the
University of Iowa 15-12 (Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 7). “March
Madness” began in 1939, when the first NCAA tournament took place at
the University of Illinois (National Center for Families Learning 2014).
Intercollegiate football’s origins can be traced back to a game in 1869
between Princeton and Rutgers, which had about 100 fans in attendance
(Bernstein in Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 30). The rules of the
game were inconsistent from college to college which made it difficult for
schools to organize games. The Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the
United States (IAAUS) created a championship game between Yale and
Princeton in 1880 (Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 10). Ten years
later, it was one of the most-watched athletic events in the nation, with an
average of 40,000 fans attending each year (Grant, Leadley and Zygmont
2008, 10). The severe violence of football could not be understated. From
1890-1905, 330 students died as a result of injuries sustained on the
football field (Zimbalist 8). Public outcry about the violence led President
Theodore Roosevelt to invite representatives from Yale, Harvard, and
Princeton to meet at the White House to discuss rule changes in 1905
(Grant, Leadly & Zygmont 2008, 15). The new rules addressed player
safety by banning specific tackling methods and outlawing rugby-style
scrums from the game altogether.
Despite the risk of serious injury, college football quickly became one
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of the most popular sports in the country. This popularity can largely be
attributed to the media’s coverage of the sport. Publishers saw the
growing interest in college sports and wanted to use it to help sell
newspapers. Football players created fascinating heroes for fans to read
about on weekends when political news was scarce. Student-athletes
playing an ultra-violent sport for the love of the game provided publishers
with a near perfect narrative (Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 11).
Growing fan interest caused the newspapers to largely ignore eligibility
scandals and the deaths caused by excessive violence on the field.
As the popularity of football grew, money in athletic programs
became more important. Having a successful team meant more revenue
from ticket sales and alumni donations, but it also meant more spending
for athletic programs. Harvard Field was the first collegiate stadium built
in 1903 (Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 12). The stadium costed
$310,000 to build (equivalent to roughly $8.2 Million in 2018) and seated
31,000 fans (Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 12). The stadium was
funded by ticket sales and a $100,000 donation by the class of 1879
(Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 12).
The large sums of money and rising pressure to succeed led to
scandals at multiple colleges. Some programs hired professional players
for their teams, while others paid high level recruits to attend their
colleges. The media occasionally reported on the scandals, but few
meaningful changes were made. In 1905, the Intercollegiate Athletic
Association of the United States decided to reform all collegiate sports
(Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 21). The athletic association stated
that its purpose was:
The regulation and supervision of college athletics throughout the
United States, in order that the athletic activities in the colleges
and universities of the United States may be maintained on an
ethical plane in keeping with the dignity and purpose of
education (Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 21).
The IAAUS officially changed its name to the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) in 1910 (Grant, Leadley and Zygmont
2008, 23).
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III. Collegiate Sports in the Modern Era
The modern era in college sports began after the end of World War II
(Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 31). Increases in television coverage
and enrollment rates made sporting events more popular than ever before.
This is when collegiate sports evolved into the billion dollar industry that
it is today. As revenues generated from college sports rose, the temptation
for schools to try to find competitive advantages increased. Rising
temptation forced the NCAA to implement new restrictions. The NCAA
made swift changes by implementing amateurism laws, establishing
eligibility requirements, and by forming different divisions for colleges to
compete in. Two committees were also formed to help the NCAA enforce
its new rules; one would investigate violations, and the other would hear
cases (NCAA 2018b).
Protecting the amateur status of college athletes was critical to the
NCAA. Members of the NCAA unanimously voted to forbid any payments
to students for their participation in athletics in 1922 (Grant, Leadley and
Zygmont 2008, 31). The vote also banned colleges from offering
scholarships to athletes. According to the NCAA website, the NCAA
membership adopted amateurism rules to: “Ensure the students’ priority
remains on obtaining a quality educational experience and that all of
student-athletes are competing equitably.”
Here is the list of things that would cause a player to lose their amateur
status according to the NCAA website:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Contracts with professional teams
Salary for participating in athletics
Prize money above actual and necessary expenses
Play with professionals
Tryouts, practice or competition with a professional team
Benefits from an agent or prospective agent
Agreement to be represented by an agent

Source: (NCAA 2014a)
Rules about scholarships were modified in 1935 when the
Southeastern Conference became the first to offer athletic scholarships
(Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 32). These athletic scholarships were
strictly limited to tuition, fees, room, board and course-related books. At
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the time, the major conferences had more influence over members than the
NCAA. The Southeastern Conference threatened to remove themselves as
members of the NCAA if athletic scholarships were not allowed, which
forced the NCAA to comply (Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 32). The
competitive nature of college athletics forced other conferences to follow
suit by offering their own scholarships. Over time, the competitive balance
in collegiate athletics began to shift in favor of schools that could afford
to give out the most scholarships. In an effort to maintain a fair playing
field, the NCAA put a limit on the number of scholarships a school could
offer. In 1973, the NCAA restricted football to a total of 105 scholarships
per school, and in 1992 reduced this number to 85 scholarships. (Grant,
Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 34). The NCAA created “headcount” and
“equivalency” athletic scholarships in 1982 (Grant, Leadley and Zygmont
2008, 35).
Headcount scholarships were designed to limit the number of full
scholarships available per varsity sport. If a sport offers twelve
scholarships, twelve new athletes can receive full scholarships each year.
Sports restricted by headcount scholarships are generally the sports that
bring the most revenue to the school (Frank 2011).
Men’s Sports Head Count Scholarships in Division I:
1. Football (85 Available per FBS team)
2. Basketball (13 Available per team)
Women’s Sports Head Count Scholarships in Division I:
1. Basketball (13 Available per team)
2. Gymnastics (12 Available per team)
3. Volleyball (12 Available per team)
4. Tennis (8 Available per team)
Source: (Frank 2011)
Equivalency scholarships are also limited in number, but the teams are
allowed to divide the scholarship amounts among multiple athletes. For
example, if a women’s soccer team is allowed 10 scholarships at $6,000
each, it can divide the total amount of money among a roster of 25 players.
The teams that use the equivalency method are usually non-revenue sports
for their respective colleges.
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Men’s Sport Equivalency Scholarships in Division I:
Baseball, Rifle, Skiing, Cross-Country, Track and Field, Soccer,
Fencing, Swimming, Golf, Tennis, Gymnastics, Volleyball, Ice
Hockey, Water Polo, Lacrosse, Wrestling.
Women’s Sport Equivalency Scholarships in Division I:
Bowling, Lacrosse, Rowing, Cross-Country, Track and Field, Skiing,
Fencing, Soccer, Field Hockey, Softball, Golf, Swimming, Ice
Hockey, Water Polo.
Note: All Division II and NAIA programs are equivalency sports.
Source: (Frank 2011)
In 1973 the NCAA required schools to offer only one-year athletic
scholarships, with the option to renew the offer each year (Grant, Leadley
and Zygmont 2008, 35). The one-year renewal structure of athletic
scholarships has not changed since then. This means that student-athletes
who are injured, or those who are not performing up to the level their
coaches expected, may not have their scholarship renewed the following
year. If a college plans to reduce or not renew a student-athlete’s aid, the
school must notify them in writing by July 1 and provide the student with
an opportunity to appeal (NCAA 2017c). In most cases, coaches decide
who receives a scholarship, the scholarship amount and whether it will be
renewed (NCAA 2017c).
The NCAA passed Proposition 48 in 1983, which put minimum
eligibility requirements in place for students to qualify for athletic
scholarships (Wikipedia 2018e). The goal of this was to ensure that only
students who were prepared to balance athletics and academics were
admitted into colleges. In order to be eligible, student-athletes must:
•
•
•
•

•

Graduate high school
Have an SAT Score: $ 860 or Act Score: $ 16
Maintain a 2.3 GPA (Raised from 2.0 in 2015)
Complete 16 core courses during High School (4 English, 3 Math,
2 Science, 1 Additional Math, Science, or English 2 Social
Science, 4 Other)
Complete 10 core courses before their seventh semester of college

Source: (NCAA 2018b)
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Divisions were established by the NCAA in 1973 (Grant, Leadley and
Zygmont 2008, 39). The NCAA split its membership into three divisions:
Division I, Division II, and Division III (Wikipedia 2018a). Football in
Division I is divided further into Football Bowl Subdivision schools (FBS)
and Football Championship Subdivision Schools (FCS). Each division has
its own requirements for membership based on the number of scholarships
funded, the ability to schedule games against opponents in their division,
and the number of varsity sports offered at each school (Grant, Leadley
and Zygmont 2008, 39). Divisions were established to create parity and a
more level playing field in intercollegiate sports (Berkman 2015).
Divisions give smaller schools with fewer resources the opportunity to
compete for championships. Division I schools have the largest athletic
department budgets, and compete at the highest level. Division III schools
tend to have the smallest athletic department budgets and are not allowed
to offer athletic scholarships. This paper will focus primarily on sports at
the Division I level because this is where the majority of revenue is
generated within the various NCAA divisions.
Division

Median Revenue Generated
per college in 2014 (All Sports)

Division I-FBS

$62,275,000

Division I-FCS

$15,315,000

Division I-Without Football

$14,413,000

Division II

$5,172,900

Division II-Without Football

$4,102,200

Division III

*No Revenue information
available* Median Expenses for
a Division III college with
football were $3,382,100

Source: (NCAA 2015)
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IV. Conferences in Division I Athletics
Conferences were created to coordinate competition during the regular
season and organize postseason championships among a group of colleges.
There are a few colleges who have remained independent outside of
conferences, such as Notre Dame, but the overwhelming majority of
Division I colleges are members of a conference. In the modern era,
conferences share the revenue from television contracts and payments
from bowl appearances (Statistic Brain 2016). Conferences are often
organized by geographic location, and teams within the same conference
often have similar resources which facilitates parity on the field. Schools
want to join conferences competing at the highest level so they can be
exposed to more media coverage and draw a national audience.
There are currently eleven FBS conferences and thirteen FCS
conferences in Division I football, but not all conferences are created equal
(Wikipedia 2018d). The budgets of the major conferences are massive
compared to the other conferences.
FBS Conference
Big Ten
SEC
Big 12
ACC
Pac-12
American
Mountain West
Conference USA
Mid-American Conference
Western Athletic Conference
Sun Belt
Source: (McCready 2016)

Average Budget Per School
from 2005-2015 (All Sports)
$85 Million
$80 Million
$71 Million
$64 Million
$61 Million
$53 Million
$34 Million
$26 Million
$22 Million
$21 Million
$17 Million

Based on budgets alone, four separate athletic departments in the bottom
four conferences could be funded for the price of one Big Ten or SEC
school (McCready 2016).
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Conference champions from the five major conferences (ACC, Big 12,
Big Ten, Pac-12, SEC) receive automatic bids to the most lucrative bowl
games (Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 43). The payout to colleges for
making it to a bowl game ranged from $300,000 for making the Famous
Idaho Potato Bowl, to $4,250,000 for schools competing in the Citrus
Bowl (Statistic Brain 2016). Revenues for colleges competing in the
college football playoff that decides the national champion are even larger.
An estimated $6 million bonus is paid to each team a conference sends to
the semifinals of the playoffs (Statistic Brain 2016). Power 5 conferences
receive an estimated $50 million from the NCAA whether or not it
qualifies a team for the playoffs (Statistic Brain 2016). Revenues from the
NCAA for colleges in the FBS that belong to conferences outside the
Power 5 total $18 million each (Statistic Brain 2016).
The average budget of a National Championship football team was
almost $100 million per year over the last ten years (McCready 2016). The
ultimate goal of every school is to win a national championship, but
schools outside of these conferences may not be given the chance to
compete for one. The University of Central Florida, members of the
American Athletic Conference, completed a perfect 13-0 season in 2017.
They were, however, not invited to compete for a national championship
in the college football playoff, largely because of their conference
affiliation. UCF later proclaimed themselves National Champions after
defeating Auburn in the Peach Bowl.
There are 32 conferences competing in Division I basketball
(Wikipedia 2018d). The winner of each of the conference’s postseason
tournament receives an automatic invitation to participate in the NCAA
tournament, where college basketball’s national champion is crowned. The
NCAA is currently in the middle of a 14-year contract with Turner Sports
worth $10.8 billion (Mann 2014). This contract gives Turner the rights to
broadcast the NCAA’s annual “March Madness” tournament. In 2013,
$190 Million dollars was split among conferences competing in the
tournament (Mann 2014). The further an individual team advances, the
more money its conference receives.
Adding a few hundred thousand dollars to a program’s budget could
be offset by a deep tournament run. Schools in Power 5 conferences (ACC,
Big 12, Big Ten, Pac-12, SEC) have more flexibility to spend more
because their conferences often get more teams in the NCAA tournament.
North Carolina, for example, is better off than Northern Iowa because it
plays in the ACC, which typically sends more teams to the tournament

10
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than the Missouri Valley. The six largest conferences (ACC, Big East, Big
12, Big Ten, Pac-10, SEC) took home an average of seven times as much
money as their peers (Mann 2014).
Profits in major conferences are far greater than those in other, smaller
conferences, who are losing money in some cases. This is a big reason why
smaller conferences struggle to compete against the schools in major
divisions.
FBS Conference
SEC
Big 12
Big Ten
Pac 12
ACC
American
Mid-American Conference
Mountain West
Western Athletic Conference
Conference USA
Sun Belt
Source: (McCready 2016)

Average Profit Per School from
2005-2015 (All Sports)
$7.3 Million
$6.3 Million
$4.1 Million
$2.3 Million
$2.1 Million
$723,000
$311,000
$118,000
$66,000
$ (22,000)
$ (654,000)

It is clear that there is a large disparity in budgets and profits among
conferences, but why do colleges have athletic programs in the first place,
and where does the funding for athletics come from?

V. Why do colleges have athletic programs?
Athletic programs were initially put in place to help colleges recruit
students during the expansion of postgraduate study (Grant, Leadley and
Zygmont 2008, 4). The purpose of athletic programs has pivoted over time
as colleges have gained the resources necessary to support their graduate
programs. Below are some of the incentives colleges have to create
successful athletic programs.
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Direct Profits:
Athletic programs are a major source of revenue for select colleges.
Media rights, ticket sales, and alumni donations contribute millions of
dollars to elite programs like Michigan and Alabama. According to a study
by ESPN, the University of Alabama brought in almost $124 million in
revenue from their football program in 2008 (Emma 2010). The school
saw revenue of more than $13 million from media and branding rights, $28
million in ticket sales and almost $30 million in donations (Emma 2010).
Enrollment:
While student-athletes may choose a college because of its athletic
program, the reputation a school earns from sports can draw non-athletes
as well. The idea that a school’s athletic success is positively correlated
with admissions is known as the Flutie effect (Grant, Leadley and
Zygmont 2008, 147). Doug Flutie was a star quarterback that led Boston
College to a comeback win over Miami in a nationally televised game in
the 1980’s. Admission applications to Boston College increased by 16
percent the following year which caused many universities to ask if
increased athletic spending could boost enrollment (Grant, Leadley and
Zygmont 2008, 311).
“Universities with more resources spend more on athletics, and get
better students as a result. Schools spend resources on athletics because it,
along with better education is what students want.” (Osborne in Grant,
Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 51) But what happens to applications when
a school’s athletic performance begins to drop? “One could infer that the
pursuit of athletic success by many schools simultaneously will create
many losers for every winner, damaging the vast majority of schools that
spend liberally in an attempt to achieve athletic success.” (Osborne in
Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 51)
Boston College has downplayed the Flutie effect in recent years. It
argued that admissions continued to rise despite losing seasons, and that
admissions rose twelve of thirteen years prior to Flutie’s arrival on campus
(Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 312). Rising admissions appear to be
primarily correlated with success in football, and the boost in enrollment
generally only lasts a year or two (Desrochers 2013). The overall impact
of the Flutie effect is unclear, but many universities still attempt to attract
more students through increased athletic spending.

12

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2018

Branding:
Fan loyalty and team spirit can engulf a campus and its surrounding
community. Big name colleges like Ohio State, Notre Dame, Duke, and
Kentucky have developed sports cultures that have made their schools
household names. Successful branding can lead to larger donations from
alumni and fans. The Oklahoma State athletic department received $55
million in donations in 2008 (Emma 2010). Students who take pride in
their school’s athletic program may develop lifelong commitments to their
fellow students and their school. Universities hope that this common bond
pays off in the long-term when alumni gather together and donate to their
alma mater.

VI. Where does the funding for Athletic Programs come
from?
Funding for public universities comes from a variety of sources including
government subsidies, research grants, donations, sponsorships, and tuition
and fee payments (Ridpath 2014). When debating ways to cut expenses for
students, the focus is often put on lowering tuition, but many ignore the
rising cost of student fees. According to a study from the Center for
College Affordability and Productivity, student fees are increasing at a rate
13 percent higher than tuition (Ridpath 2014). These fees can cost an
average of $2000-5000 per year at some public institutions (Ridpath
2014). Many students are unaware how much of their money is allocated
to athletics. The largest student fee across many non Power Five
conferences is for intercollegiate sports. This athletic fee can be as large
as 80 percent of the total fee amount at some schools (Ridpath 2014).
Student fees allocated to athletics at the University of Northern Iowa
totaled $1,749,975 in 2014 (Earl 2015). Smaller conferences who do not
have the budgets or television revenue of the major conferences try to
compete through increased student fees and university subsidies.
The majority of athletic programs rely on student fees, donations, and
subsidies from the school and state to survive. Subsidies for all of Division
I athletics rose by nearly $200 million from 2011 to 2013 (Berkowitz
2013). University spending on athletics has increased in recent years,
while spending on academics has remained stagnant on average
(Berkowitz 2013). This raises a question about whether universities are
focusing too much on athletics instead of their primary purpose of
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providing students with a quality education. The images below shed light
on how the average spending on student-athletes has outpaced spending on
the average student.

Source: (Weebly 2015)
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Each college has its own unique method to support its athletic
programs. Twenty percent of athletic department income at FBS schools
came from institutional support (Burnsed 2015). FCS institutions and
those without football relied on institutional support for 70 percent of their
budget (Burnsed 2015). In 2014, The University of Northern Iowa
provided $4,198,014 in scholarships and general expenses to its athletic
department (Earl 2015). Many schools have not revealed exact figures
about how much they spend on athletics, but the evidence is clear that
most schools rely heavily on funds outside of their athletic departments to
stay afloat.
Large parts of athletic departments’ budgets are allocated to men’s
football and basketball, but a significant amount is spent on the less
profitable sports. Cathy Andreen, a spokeswoman from the University of
Alabama stated that, "The University continues to provide institutional
support for Athletics, because Alabama believes that Title IX sports are
important and we invest in them to ensure their ongoing success — as
demonstrated by our softball, gymnastics and women's golf national
championships” (Berkowitz 2013). Title IX and its potential impact on a
college’s ability to pay athletes will be discussed later on. Now that the
sources of funding for athletic departments have been revealed, it’s time
to move into the economics behind the market for collegiate athletes.

VII. Monopsony in Collegiate Athletics
Every year, thousands of high school athletes offer their athletic talents to
a college in return for some form of financial assistance and the promise
of an education. Despite the large number of buyers and sellers in the
market for college sports, the labor market for student-athletes cannot be
described as competitive. The NCAA limits the “maximum institutional
financial aid” that a student-athlete can receive during an academic year
(Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 128). This limitation on financial aid
represents a form of price fixing. The NCAA put these restrictions in place
to ensure that colleges are unable to compete for athletes on price.
Consequently, the revenue contributed by the student-athlete to the school
(the Marginal Revenue Product, or MRP), is sometimes greater than the
scholarship they receive. The universities want to attract the best athletes
possible in spite of these price restrictions, so they attempt to recruit
athletes in other ways. Recruiters often highlight their athletic facilities,
the reputation of their athletic programs, the academic reputation of the
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institution, and the amenities offered in their respective college
communities. Student-athletes will also consider things like the variety of
majors offered by the school, the distance the college is from their
hometown, and other factors when deciding which college to attend.
A monopsony is a market with only one buyer (Becker and Posner
2011). Price fixing has created an effect similar to a monopsony in the
NCAA. Monopsonies require an agreement among competitors not to pay
more than a fixed price for a key input, such as labor (Becker and Posner
2011). By agreeing to pay less, the cartel purchases less of the input
because less labor is supplied at the lower price. The NCAA has created
a cartel that behaves like a monopsony by forbidding its members from
paying its student-athletes. Monopsonies are generally illegal in the United
States, but the NCAA has been able to successfully justify its
monopsonistic behavior to this point. The NCAA is considered a nonprofit organization because it is “organized and operated exclusively for
academic purposes” (Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 462). The NCAA
argues that athletes are students first, and that they would be corrupted if
they were given a salary on top of their scholarship. This, combined with
the fact that the members of the NCAA, and the NCAA itself, are formally
not-for-profit institutions, have allowed the NCAA to continue to enforce
rules against paying student-athletes (Becker and Posner 2011).
Monopsonies will hire employees until the Marginal Revenue Product
(MRP) is equal to the Marginal Cost of Labor (MCL). Monopsonies are
forced to pay each additional worker the same wage as the previous
worker that was hired because they are unable to wage discriminate. This
explains why headcount scholarships are the same for each new studentathlete “hired” by a university. The reservation wage is the lowest wage
rate at which a worker would be willing to accept a particular type of job
(Wikipedia 2018f). Student-athletes’ reservation wage is less than or equal
to the athletic scholarship that they choose to accept from a college. The
marginal cost of labor is greater than the reservation wage that studentathletes are willing to work for. The difference between the MRP and the
supply of labor is referred to as a monopsonistic rent (Grant, Leadley and
Zygmont 2008, 141). Monopsonies lead to fewer workers being hired and
at a lower wage than they would receive in a competitive market. This
benefits the NCAA at the expense of the student-athlete, because some
elite athletes receive less than they would in a competitive market. In the
absence of NCAA price fixing, some colleges would likely expand team
rosters and increase compensation in certain headcount sports. More
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student-athletes would be competing in these sports at the college level
and they would be paid more as well.
However, there are clearly some athletes who benefit from the NCAA
monopsony. It is important to recognize that scholarship athletes in lowrevenue sports such as women’s soccer or men’s wrestling are likely
receiving compensation above or close to their MRP. Athletes in low
revenue-generating sports likely do not have much of an incentive to
complain about NCAA practices. These athletes are subsidized by the
monopsonistic rents generated by the more profitable sports, like men’s
football and basketball. The deadweight loss created by the NCAA
monopsony is hard to ignore, but it is important to point out that there are
student-athletes who benefit from the cartel.

Source: (Wikibooks 2014)

VIII. Do Division I schools have the ability to pay athletes?
When the question is raised about “if someone can be paid” there must be
evidence about how much money they generate for their employer. A
person with a low MRP is unlikely to receive a large wage, while someone
with a high MRP will earn greater compensation in a competitive market.
The revenue generated by athletes for their schools comes from many
sources, including ticket sales, concessions, alumni donations, television
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and radio broadcasts, advertising, postseason tournament revenues, and
potentially through increased enrollment (Grant, Leadley and Zygmont
2008, 146). 90 percent of this revenue comes from television contracts
(Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 156).
The economic contribution of some star collegiate athletes is well in
excess of their athletic scholarship. Kemba Walker was a star point guard
for the University of Connecticut’s Division I championship basketball
team in 2011. Walker was a major reason that the college was able to
secure shares of revenues from television networks such as ESPN and
CBS. So why did fans decide to tune in to UConn’s games during the 2011
season? Did fans watch the games because of their interest in the mascots,
coaches, and uniforms? Or was it the skills of Walker and his teammates
that drew fans’ interest? Walker’s skills, combined with the talents of his
teammates, brought in 196,671 fans to UConn’s home games during the
2011-2012 season (NCAA 2017a). This resulted in large sums of revenue
for the college that far outweighed the scholarship Walker received.
While there have been numerous college stars that have generated
millions of dollars for their universities, there are not many athletic
departments making money. Only 24 out of 130 FBS schools generated
more revenue than they spent in 2014, according to the NCAA Revenues
and Expenses of Division I Intercollegiate Athletics Programs Report
(Burnsed 2015). Those 24 schools made an average of $6 million in profit
compared to just over $8 million in 2013 (Burnsed 2015). According to a
study from USA Today, about half of the remaining FBS schools are
breaking even, and the bottom third of athletic departments are operating
at a deficit (USA Today 2016). All of the schools that are profiting from
collegiate athletics come from a power five conference. The table below
shows the average Revenues and Expenses of athletic departments across
all sports over the last decade.
Very few intercollegiate sports are profitable. Recent information
provided by the NCAA shows that men’s basketball and football are the
only sports that earn revenues in excess of expenses.

18

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2018
College/Conference

Revenues

Expenses

1. Texas A&M/SEC

$194,388,450

$137,101,774

2. Texas/Big 12

$187,981,158

$171,394,287

3. Ohio State/Big Ten

$170,789,765

$166,811,018

4. Alabama/SEC

$164,009,745

$145,277,366

5. Michigan/Big Ten

$163,850,616

$157,872,099

145. Northern Iowa/MVC

$17,726,437

$18,491,770

227. Savannah State/MEAC

$5,024,258

$6,848,277

228. Mississippi Valley
State/SWAC

$4,288,571

$4,288,571

229. Coppin State/MEAC

$3,423,614

$4,307,113

230. Alabama A&M/SWAC

$2,592,683

$9,372,315

Source: (USA Today 2016)

Source: (Matlab Geeks 2011)
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As of yet, no women’s sports, or any sport at the Division II or
Division III level, are close to being profitable (Burnsed 2015). This means
that payments to athletes based on their MRP would result in large
inequality. Payments would depend on the skills of the athletes, and the
popularity of their sport. Could all college athletes, regardless of gender
or sport, be compensated based on their MRP? Absolutely, but the
majority of student-athletes would receive nothing because their MRP is
close to zero. Athletes in low-revenue generating sports, like golf, would
be hurt by a change from grant-in aid to payment based on productivity.
However, there are Division I schools in a position to pay their players
a wage closer to their MRP. Monopsonistic rents captured by university
athletic departments are spent in a variety of ways: recruiting, athletic
department salaries, new construction of facilities, and maintenance of
existing facilities (Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 151). Paying these
student-athletes might not increase the spending of athletic departments
dramatically; it may just redistribute the spending. Rather than spending
millions of dollars on coaches’ salaries and fancy athletic facilities, some
colleges could likely afford to pay their star players a more competitive
wage.

IX. Why are some Athletic Departments losing money?
The NCAA’s scholarship restrictions have created an “arms race” among
its members to find ways to attract the best recruits to their colleges. The
average amount spent per year by athletic departments has doubled in the
past 10 years, from about $33M in 2005 to over $66M in 2015 (McCready
2016). This has led to unsustainable spending habits that are causing some
schools to lose millions of dollars in hopes of becoming a successful
program in the long run.
Recruiting:
Recruiting top athletes to a school is one of a coach’s most important
jobs. The recruiting process in collegiate athletics is ultracompetitive. It
is not uncommon for high school All Americans to receive attention from
dozens of Division I programs. The NCAA does not have any restrictions
on the amount of money a school can spend on recruiting; it only limits the
recruiting methods that schools can use. For this reason, it is no surprise
that schools are willing to pull out all the stops to help them convince top
recruits to sign a national letter of intent with their college.
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The competitiveness of recruiting is another indicator that the NCAA
is successfully operating like a monopsonistic cartel. The University of
Oregon had a $600,000 recruiting budget for its football team in 2004
(Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 287). During one weekend visit that
season, Oregon spent $140,875 in transportation, meals, and entertainment
for twenty four recruits. (Grant, Leadley and Zygmont 2008, 287). Flying
recruits around on private charters and treating them to lavish meals was
commonplace until the NCAA banned these practices in 2004 (NCAA
2013a). Schools today continue to use innovative recruiting techniques to
get top athletes, and if the NCAA later bans their methods, they will
simply find other means to attract them. Recruiting is a major expense for
many athletic departments, and a big reason why some schools are losing
money on athletics.
Moving up to the Big Time:
Some colleges believe that increased spending on athletics will
enhance the status of their institution and create enough revenue to offset
the increase in expenses. Portland State University nearly tripled its budget
when it moved from Division II to Division 1 FCS in 1996 (Grant, Leadley
and Zygmont 2008, 293). Expenses slightly outpaced revenues and
deficits were made up by increases in student fees and institutional
subsidies. “Some smaller institutions have coveted the potential revenues
and public notice associated with high-profile sports programs, the
temptation for these institutions to promote athletics has been intense and
at times irresistible.” (Stern 2003)
Cross-Subsidization within Athletic Departments:
Most college sports at a typical Division I school lose money. As
we’ve seen, the majority of revenues generated by athletic departments
come from football and men’s basketball. The profits generated by these
sports are typically used to subsidize less profitable sports. Colleges justify
the pursuit of increased revenues through increased athletic spending on
the grounds that failing to do so will result in the elimination of many
sports for both genders. The counterargument to this is that some schools
have cut sports during times when revenues were increasing within their
athletic departments. Regardless, many athletic directors still cite crosssubsidization as a reason for their colleges to continue to run a deficit.
University of Tennessee Athletic Director Doug Dickey stated, “The
biggest fans of our football program are the volleyball coach and the crew
coach” (Weiner 2002).
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Arms Race:
The NCAA “arms race” refers to the large amounts of money that
colleges spend to differentiate themselves from other colleges to land the
best recruits. Colleges spend millions of dollars annually on facilities to
compete with other top-tier college sports programs. In 2014, 48 FBS
schools spent a combined $772 million on athletic facilities (Hobson
2015). Expenditures increased by 89-percent (adjusted for inflation) from
the $408 million that was spent in 2004 (Hobson 2015). Decades of
exuberant spending on facilities has redefined what it takes to compete,
and the spending does not appear to be slowing down. New arenas must
now be complemented by practice facilities and lavish locker rooms
covered in high-definition televisions with video game systems in order to
lure top prospects.
Coaches’ salaries make up a major part of the NCAA arms race. It is
not uncommon for Division I coaches to be the highest paid public
employee in their respective states. A college football or men's basketball
coach was the highest-paid employee in 39 of the 50 states in 2016
(Gibson 2017). The lowest salary paid to an FBS head coach was New
Mexico State’s Doug Martin who made $376,044 in 2017 (Schnaars
2018). College football's highest paid coach was Alabama’s Nick Saban,
who received $11,132,000 during the same year (Schnaars 2018).
Assistant coaches at most Power 5 schools are paid very well too. The top
100 highest paid assistant coaches in Division I college football made at
least $500,000 in 2016 (Gibson 2017). Enormous spending on facilities
and coaches salaries lead some to question why players aren’t receiving
more financial support from colleges. The chart below provides a
breakdown of how the average Division I athletic department spends its
money.
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Source: (McCready 2016)

X. Early Entry
Early entry is a situation where a player still has remaining years of
college eligibility but chooses to opt out of collegiate sports in the hopes
of a professional career. If a student-athlete leaves early and breaks
NCAA amateurism rules, he will lose his athletic eligibility and will no
longer be able to compete in collegiate athletics (NCAA 2014a). A current
student-athlete loses amateur status in a particular sport by asking to be
placed on the draft list of a professional league in that sport. Studentathletes’ amateur status is lost even if the athlete is not drafted, or the
athlete is drafted but does not sign an agreement with a professional team
(NCAA 2018c).
A student-athlete, his or her parents, or the university’s professional
sports counseling panel may negotiate with a professional sports
organization without the loss of the student-athlete’s amateur status
(NCAA 2018c). However, a student-athlete who retains an agent will lose
his amateur status (NCAA 2018c). NCAA rules allow basketball players
to leave college if one year has elapsed since high school graduation, or if
three years have elapsed for football players (Grant, Leadley and Zygmont
2008, 152). Football players are only draft-eligible for the NFL in the year
after the end of their college eligibility (NFL Football Operations 2018).
The NCAA reformed its laws regarding top college basketball players’
eligibility for the NBA draft in 2015 (NCAA 2018c). The changes allowed
players with remaining college eligibility to compete in the NBA draft
combine and speak with teams to get a better feel for where they might be
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taken in the draft without losing their amateur status. Student-athletes can
enter the NBA draft multiple times without jeopardizing eligibility and
may participate in the combine and one tryout per NBA team, per year
(NCAA 2016). Underclassmen who declare for the draft must remove their
name by April 10 to retain eligibility (NCAA 2018c). If underclassmen
declare after April 10, they will lose all remaining college eligibility
(NCAA 2018c). Upperclassmen must remove their name from the NBA
draft list 10 days after the conclusion of the NBA draft combine to remain
eligible (NCAA 2016). The NBA combined is scheduled to take place
May 16-20 this year. According to the NCAA website, the rule change was
designed, “to help student-athletes make a decision earlier than in the past
to focus on either academics or athletics and also give coaches more
flexibility with roster-planning and recruiting.” (NCAA 2014a).
Many players who decide to leave school early do so because the
opportunity cost of staying in school is outweighed by the potential of
earning a lucrative contract in professional sports. Student-athletes from
disadvantaged households often leave early in an attempt to support their
families. Critics of early entry are correct when they say that the odds of
success are stacked against those who leave college early. Just 1.1 percent
of college basketball players and 1.5 percent of college football players
play a game in a major sports league according to the NCAA (NCAA
2017b). For every player who successfully makes it to the pros, there are
dozens more who do not. In many cases, those who fail to make it to the
pros cannot resume their collegiate career because of the NCAA’s
amateurism rules. Some of those who lose eligibility are unable to afford
to return to school because of the finances required.
The NCAA argues that its limitations on leaving early are in the best
interest of the student-athlete. Early entry rules were designed to push
student-athletes toward finishing their degrees and to protect them from
falling victim to the pressures of agents, the greed of their friends and
family, and their own unrealistic expectations. The NCAA encourages
those interested in pursuing a pro career to finish their degree so they have
something to fall back on if their pursuit doesn’t work out. While early
entry mainly applies to athletes in male sports, it is time to examine Title
IX and discuss the potential implications it may have on paying studentathletes.

XI. Title IX
Title IX is seen as a major roadblock for those who want division I athletes
to earn a salary. Title IX is a federal law passed in 1972 that states: "No
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person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." (NCAA 2014b). Title IX applies to all educational institutions
that receive federal funds. While this law was originally created to apply
to education programs, most Title IX lawsuits today involve college
athletics. According to the NCAA website, there are three basic parts of
Title IX that apply to college athletics:
1. Participation: Title IX requires that women and men be provided
equitable opportunities to participate in sports. Title IX does not
require institutions to offer identical sports but an equal opportunity
to play;
2. Scholarships: Title IX requires that female and male student-athletes
receive athletics scholarship dollars proportional to their participation;
and
3. Other benefits: Title IX requires the equal treatment of female and
male student-athletes in the provisions of: (a) equipment and supplies;
(b) scheduling of games and practice times; (c) travel and daily
allowance/per diem; (d) access to tutoring; (e) coaching, (f) locker
rooms, practice and competitive facilities; (g) medical and training
facilities and services; (h) housing and dining facilities and services;
(i) publicity and promotions; (j) support services and (k) recruitment
of student-athletes.
Source: (NCAA 2014b)

Colleges are responsible for making sure that they are in compliance
with federal laws. Title IX establishes that “there cannot be an economic
justification for discrimination” (NCAA 2014b). Colleges cannot claim
that there are revenue or other considerations that mandate that certain
sports receive better treatment or participation opportunities than other
sports (NCAA 2014b). If rules were changed that allowed players in
revenue-earning sports to earn money, Title IX would likely require that
all athletes in other sports receive the same compensation. Charles
McClelland, athletic director at Texas Southern University said:
I can't see the NCAA passing any legislation to allow additional
pay just based on revenue-producing sports, knowing all the other
sports would be adversely affected. Instead, they would have to
come up with some kind of formula that would work for all
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student-athletes, male and female, versus just those programs that
are making money. (Voepel 2011).
Title IX does not directly address whether there is a requirement for
all student-athletes to receive equal compensation beyond their
scholarships. The law only addresses scholarships and other benefits that
have already been established by NCAA rules (Voepel 2011). Title IX has
rarely been analyzed by courts in terms of pay, largely due to NCAA price
fixing. It is impossible to know how the Supreme Court would rule on this
until they actually have to decide a case. For the purpose of this paper, I
will assume that the Supreme Court would require all athletes in all sports
to receive equal compensation if reforms to current NCAA rules were
made.

XII. Cheating in College Sports
For as long as sports have existed there has been cheating, and collegiate
sports are no exception. By keeping the amount paid to elite athletes low
compared to their financial value, the NCAA has created an incentive for
some colleges to recruit elite players and keep them eligible by any means.
Some colleges will turn a blind eye to phony courses, unearned grades, and
tutors who write papers and take tests for athletes.
The NCAA has established severe penalties to try to prevent colleges
from breaking their rules. Violations are classified into four categories:
Level I, Level II, Level III, and Level IV violations. The new structure was
created in 2013 to replace the two-tier approach that focused on major and
secondary violations (NCAA 2013b). The head coach is responsible for
all violations that occur in their program (NCAA 2013b). Level I
violations are considered the most severe and often result in a loss of
eligibility (NCAA 2013b). Level IV violations are considered to be
“isolated or limited in nature” and generally do not affect student-athletes’
eligibility. The NCAA enforcement committee uses judgement to decide
the penalty given to violators, which often results in different penalties for
different colleges. Universities who self-report violations may receive
more lenient penalties. The chart below describes the different levels of
violations and some of the penalties associated with each violation
according to the NCAA website.

Violation
Level I: Severe
breach of
conduct

Examples of Violations
•
•
•
•
•

•

Level II:
Significant
breach of
conduct

•

•
•

Lack of institutional control
Academic fraud
Failure to cooperate in an NCAA enforcement
investigation
Individual unethical or dishonest conduct
Head coach responsibility violation by a head
coach resulting from an underlying Level I
violation by an individual within the sport
program.
Impermissible Benefits >$100 (Any special
arrangement by an institution employee or a
representative of the institution’s athletic interest
that provide a student-athlete a benefit that is not
generally available to other students and their
relatives and/or friends, or, is not expressly
authorized by NCAA legislation) (Niagara
University 2018).
Violations that do not rise to the level of Level I
violations and are more serious than Level III
violations.
Failure to monitor.
Systemic violations that do not amount to a lack
of institutional control.

Penalty
•
•
•
•
•

•

•

•
•
•
•

Postseason Ban (0-4 Years)
$5000 Fine + 3-5% of Total
Sports Program Budget
Scholarship reduction in Sport
involved (0-50% reduction)
Head coach suspended (0-100%
of the season)
Recruiting visit restrictions (0-26
week ban, 0-50% reduction in
visits)
Recruiting communication
restrictions (0-26 week ban on
communication with all
prospects)
Probation 0-10 Years

Postseason Ban (0-2 Years)
$5000 Fine + 0-3% of Total
Sports Program Budget
Scholarship reduction in Sport
involved (0-25%)
Head coach suspended (0-50% of
the season)

Violation
Level II:
Significant
breach of
conduct
(contined)

Examples of Violations
•

•
•

Level III: Breach •
of conduct

•

Level IV:
•
Incidental issues

Source: (NCAA 2013b)

Multiple recruiting, financial aid, or eligibility
violations that do not amount to a lack of
institutional control.
Impermissible Benefits (>$100)
Collective Level III violations.

Violations that are isolated or limited in nature;
provide no more than a minimal recruiting,
competitive or other advantage; and do not
include more than a minimal impermissible
benefit. Multiple Level IV violations may
collectively be considered a breach of conduct.
Impermissible Benefit $100 or less

Incidental infractions that are inadvertent and
isolated, technical in nature and result in a
negligible, if any, competitive advantage. Level
IV infractions generally will not affect eligibility
for intercollegiate athletics.

Penalty
•

•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

Recruiting visit restrictions (0-13
week ban, 0-25% reduction in
visits)
Recruiting communication
restrictions (0-13 week ban on
communication with all
prospects)
Probation 0-6 Years
No Postseason Ban
$5000 Fine
No Scholarship reduction
Head coach suspended (0-25% of
the season)
No recruiting restrictions
Student-athletes must repay the
value of impermissible benefit
less than $100 to a charity prior to
competing in the next contest
No Postseason Ban
$500-5,000 Fine
No scholarship reduction
No Head coach suspension
No recruiting restrictions
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The more serious the violation, the more severe the penalty. Penalties
from the NCAA range anywhere from a loss of scholarships to the “death
penalty.” The death penalty is the popular term used to describe the
NCAA’s power to ban a school for at least one year from competing in a
sport where a violation occurred (Wikipedia 2018b). It is the harshest
penalty that an NCAA member school can receive and it has only been
implemented five times (Wikipedia 2018b). The Southern Methodist
University football program was given the death penalty in 1987, after it
was proven that “under the table” payments were given to student-athletes
and their families to entice them to play at SMU (Wikipedia 2018f).
Despite the risk of harsh penalties from the NCAA, cheating scandals
continue to arise. In 2018, the NCAA stripped the 2013 National
Championship from the University of Louisville’s men’s basketball team
after evidence arose of coaches using sex workers to aid recruiting (Ranker
2018). According to documents published by Yahoo sports, at least 20
division I programs have been cited in an ongoing FBI investigation that
accuses them of providing impermissible benefits to current and former
college basketball players (Goodman 2018). Multiple academic scandals
regarding player eligibility have come about over the years as well. In
1999, the University of Minnesota was punished after it was proven that
a graduate advisor wrote over 400 academic papers on behalf of players
(Ranker 2018).
After decades of scandals, more corruption seems inevitable unless
changes are made. It is important to point out that many of the schools
committing these violations come from Power Five conferences where the
profits are highest. More than a quarter of all Division I colleges, and more
than half of the members of Power Five conferences, have committed
Level I or Level II violations in the last decade (Lederman 2016).
Reforming NCAA rules concerning the payment of athletes may be
enough to end violations against NCAA rules.

XIII. Arguments for Paying Student-Athletes
College sports at the Division I level are big business. Many athletic
departments are multi-million dollar enterprises, and the athletes who
drive these enterprises receive very little of the revenue. Colleges may
have the ability to pay athletes a more competitive wage by restructuring
their athletic department spending, or by reforming the distribution of
funds by the NCAA. Here are the possible benefits of compensating
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players in excess of their scholarships.
Reduction of Economic Exploitation:
Star players who have the talent to be drafted into professional sports
leagues have the potential to bring in millions of dollars to their colleges.
Players like Oklahoma point guard Trae Young, or Heisman-winning
quarterback Lamar Jackson, attract a national following for their teams.
These elite players are exploited by the monopsony created by the NCAA.
The value of scholarships for star players is far below what they would
receive in a competitive market. The average value of a scholarship for a
men’s basketball or football player was $38,246, and $36,070 respectively
in 2015 (Scholarship Stats 2014). Economists have estimated that a star
player on a Division I football or basketball team generates $406,914 to
$1,194,469 for his school per season (Stars in the study were defined as a
player who is drafted by the NFL or NBA) (Brown and Jewell, 2004). The
same study revealed that elite women’s basketball players, like former
Baylor star Brittney Griner, can generate an estimated $250,000 for their
school per season (Brown and Jewell, 2004). The revenues generated by
these student-athletes for their -athletic departments are far greater than the
value of the athletic scholarships they receive.
College Sports are a Full-Time Job:
Being a college athlete requires one hundred percent dedication. These
student-athletes must find ways to manage their time between
weightlifting, attending daily practices, performing well academically, and
being ready to play games each week. Students who are not involved in
sports have more time to find a job to help support themselves. College
athletes do not have this ability and should be helped financially for their
time.
Injury Risk:
Players are injured quite frequently in college athletics. Sometimes the
injuries are so severe that they may completely end the sports career of the
student-athlete. The NCAA’s one year renewable scholarship policy does
not protect players who are injured from losing their scholarships (NCAA
2017c). Coaches are allowed to take a student-athlete’s scholarship away
if injuries prevent them from performing up to their expectations. Athletes
should be compensated for the risk of sustaining a serious injury and the
potential loss of their scholarship.
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Reduction in Corruption:
Removing the NCAA’s pricing restriction and allowing colleges to pay
athletes may reduce colleges’ incentives to cheat by paying players “under
the table.” Corruption involving coaches, boosters, and others trying to
exploit athletes would likely be reduced if colleges were given the ability
to pay players. Reductions in cheating would likely reduce the cost of
recruiting, and the amount spent on facilities in the arms race. If pricing
restrictions were removed, larger portions of monopsonistic rents could be
given to the players that are contributing to the college’s revenue streams,
instead of being spent on upgrading facilities.
Support for their Family:
Many players being exploited by the NCAA monopsony come from
urban low-income families. Star players often leave school early because
of pressure to be a main provider for their family at a young age. While
student-athletes who receive full scholarships are given most of the
necessities they need, their family members back home may still be
struggling. Paying student-athletes would allow players to give money
back to the families who helped them get to the Division I level.
Potential Reduction in Development Costs:
Granting colleges the ability to pay athletes would likely cause
colleges to pursue relationships with professional sports leagues who have
interest in the development of their players. The NCAA currently trains
future professional athletes at no cost to the professional leagues. If
student-athletes were paid, these leagues would be more likely to step in
and support the development of top prospects, which would save colleges
money in development costs.
Discourages Early Entry:
Many student-athletes who decide to leave college early to pursue a
professional sports career do so because the opportunity cost of staying in
school is too high. If these players received compensation in addition to
their scholarships, the opportunity cost of staying in school would be
reduced, which would cause more student-athletes to return to college.
This would result in higher graduation rates and a lower failure rate among
players who try to leave school early to pursue a professional sports career.
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Non-graduates will be in a more advantageous position:
Not every student-athlete who attends a college goes on to receive a
degree from the university. Paying players would put those who fail to
graduate in a better economic situation than they would have been in if
they were not paid during their time in college.
Prepares Student-Athletes for the Major Leagues:
Many players who go straight from college to making millions of
dollars in professional sports leagues do not know how to manage their
money properly. A large percentage of professional sports players go
broke within a few years of retirement. Paying them during their college
days might teach them how to manage their money better, and may prevent
them from making the same mistakes as former college stars.

XIV. Arguments Against Paying Student-Athletes
Many of those in favor of paying student-athletes fail to acknowledge the
issues related to compensating them. The biggest argument against paying
college athletes is that they are already being paid with an athletic
scholarship that is worth $20,000 to $50,000 per year (Scholarship Stats
2014). This scholarship does not include the free gear, first class coaching,
or the unlimited use of top-notch athletic facilities that these studentathletes also receive from colleges. Here are some of the arguments and
consequences that may result from compensating players in excess of their
scholarships.
Education:
Education is the primary benefit offered by NCAA colleges. Earning
a college degree will help former players earn more money than those who
only have a high school diploma, regardless of whether they pursue a
professional sports career. Colleges provide their student-athletes with free
tutoring, study groups, and other support systems to help them keep up
with academics. Bachelor’s degree holders earn 31 percent more than
workers with an Associate’s degree and 74 percent more than those with
just a high school diploma (Friedman 2011).
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Source: (Frank 2011)
The average student in the class of 2016 graduated with $37,172 in
student loan debt (Student Loan Hero 2018). Student-athletes on full
scholarship can graduate with a four-year degree without accumulating any
debt from student loans; that is something many of their classmates will
not be able to do. The NCAA is adding thousands of dollars to studentathletes lifetime earnings by providing full scholarship athletes with a free
education. The value of the free education provided by colleges should be
enough compensation for student-athletes.
Student-Athletes receive numerous benefits:
In addition to a free education, student-athletes also receive free
books, room, board, and allowances to cover the incidental costs of college
such as transportation and personal expenses. In April 2014, the Division
I Board of Directors voted to allow schools to provide scholarship and
non-scholarship athletes with unlimited meals and snacks (Berkowitz and
Kreighbaum 2015). Student-athletes competing in headcount sports are
given everything that they need to survive, along with additional stipends
that can be used for almost anything. This should eliminate the need for
additional compensation.
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Free Training/Exposure:
The NCAA serves as a free developmental league for all five major
sports leagues in America (MLB, MLS, NBA, NHL, NFL). College
provides student-athletes with a national stage that allows them to
demonstrate their talents in front of thousands of fans and professional
scouts. Student-athletes are given the best training, coaching, and facilities
in developmental sports. Elite student-athletes often decide to go to college
because they believe that it will give them the best chance of being drafted
into a professional sports league. The free training and exposure provided
by the NCAA adds even more value to student-athletes’ scholarships.
Decreased Interest in College Sports:
The competition to gain viewers among collegiate athletics and
professional sports has been present for decades. The entities have been
able to coexist for years because of agreements made between the NCAA
and professional sports leagues to broadcasting games on different days.
These agreements are why you typically see television broadcasts of
college football on Saturdays and broadcasts of NFL football games on
Sundays (Grant, Leadly and Zygmont, 2008, 40). Amateurism is a key
factor that draws some sports fans toward collegiate athletics and away
from viewing professional sports. Some viewers may be turned off by the
professionalism that would be established if student-athletes earned a
salary in excess of their scholarship. Paying student-athletes may lead to
fewer people watching college sports, which would reduce the NCAA’s
revenue stream and potentially cause conflicts with their television
partners.
Great Inequality in Compensation:
There is a large disparity in the revenues earned from different sports
across college athletics. If Title IX restrictions were lifted, and colleges
were able to compete for athletes in an open market, there would be a large
imbalance in the compensation offered to prospective student-athletes.
Schools with the largest budgets would be able to offer top prospects the
most money, which would widen the competition gap that already exists
between conferences even further. In an open market, conflicts may arise
within locker rooms because some players would be earning more than
their teammates. Salaries may also put increased pressure on studentathletes to succeed. If salaries were announced to the public, fans’
expectations for student-athletes would rise directly with the salaries they
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receive. This increased pressure could negatively affect student-athletes
on the playing field and hurt their ability to perform in the classroom as
well.
Paying Athletes may Eliminate some Non-Revenue Sports:
A major concern of those opposed to paying players in revenue
generating sports is the potential for the elimination of sports that are not
profitable. Title XI currently protects these sports from discrimination, but
the law does not specifically address compensation in excess of
scholarships, which leaves the door open for potential changes. If colleges
had to start paying college athletes in men’s football and basketball, the
money would have to come from other parts of the college’s budget. I’ve
suggested that payments for student-athletes could come from a reduction
in spending on coaches’ salaries and facilities. Some colleges might
restructure their spending like this, but many colleges would likely begin
to cut funding for other programs in order to make up for the increased
expenses. This would harm student-athletes of both genders who compete
in non-revenue sports.
Less Emphasis on Academics:
Spending increases on college athletics have already led some to
question if colleges are too focused on sports instead of improving the
education offered to students. Compensating student-athletes would
reinforce this narrative, and put even more pressure on student-athletes to
perform well on the field. Student-athletes receiving salaries might be
more likely to spend time training to justify their salary instead of focusing
on academics. Paying student-athletes may also create a divide between
student-athletes and their fellow classmates. Student’s might develop an
“Us vs Them” mentality towards student-athletes, especially if their
salaries were paid for by increased student fees. Collegiate sports are
designed to bring campuses and communities together, but paying players
might damage this relationship.
Some Student-Athletes couldn’t Handle Additional Compensation:
The NCAA has suggested through its amateurism policies, that
student-athletes may be corrupted if they received additional compensation
outside of their scholarships. Student-athletes are not given an option
about what their scholarship money goes towards. While I’m sure many
student-athletes would be able to responsibly handle additional funds,

Kilburg: Should Division I College Athletes Receive Compensation 35
some student-athletes may struggle to do so. Paying student-athletes might
lead some to spend money on illicit activities or make poor financial
decisions. This could potentially damage the reputation of colleges and
their respective athletic programs.

XV. Critiquing Both Views
A. Weaknesses in the Argument for Paying Student-Athletes
It’s a Full Time Job:
Student-athletes put in countless hours of work to develop their games
and succeed at the Division I level. While it is true that regular students
have more time to get jobs to support themselves than student-athletes,
many of these students must also work long hours to pay for many of the
things student-athletes receive for free.
Injury Risk:
Intercollegiate athletes, particularly those participating in violent
sports like Football and Hockey, subject themselves to significant injury
risk. These same athletes have been subjecting themselves to similar injury
risks in youth sports long before they got to the college ranks. These
student-athletes are not forced to participate in intercollegiate sports, and
if the risk of injury is too high, they could consider other options instead.
Reduction in Corruption:
Removing price restrictions would likely prevent some colleges from
paying players “under the table”, but there is no guarantee that it would
completely eliminate corruption in college sports. Colleges are constantly
trying to get a recruiting edge. What would stop colleges from offering top
prospects gifts in addition to the wages they would receive? The NCAA
would be forced to hire additional oversight to monitor transactions
between colleges and student-athletes. The expense of additional oversight
would likely outweigh the potential savings that may come from
reductions in cheating.
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B. Weaknesses in the Argument Against Paying Student-Athletes
Education:
The ultimate goal of the college experience is to graduate college. The
NCAA reported that its Graduation Success Rate (GSR) for studentathletes hit an all-time high of 87 percent based on the 2014-2017
graduating classes at Division I schools, which is higher than the typical
graduation rate for non-athletes (Wharton 2017). While this measure may
appear good on paper, student-athletes graduation rates do not tell the
whole story. The average GSR for football and men’s basketball players
from Power 5 conferences was 69 in 2017 (Rittenberg 2018). Studentathletes GSR is not reduced for those who leave school in good academic
standing, but the Federal rate for non-athletes is reduced for this
(Steinbach 2011). The 87 percent rate also marked the first time studentathletes from Ivy League colleges were used for the study (Wharton 2017).
Both of these things inflate the GSR for student-athletes to a rate higher
than it has been in the past.
The education argument ignores the fact that some degrees are worth
far more than others. Clustering is a term used to describe a situation
where 25 percent or more of a student-athlete population is pursuing the
same major (Steinbach 2011). Many student-athletes are clustered into
majors that don’t set them up for success later in life. A study from USA
Today found that 58 percent of junior and senior football players at the
University of Southern California majored in sociology in 2007 (Lederman
2008). The same study also found that 31 of 41 football players at the
University of Michigan majored in general studies. (Lederman 2008).
Clustering raises the question if some schools are routing their players to
take easier courses that will allow them to remain eligible, instead of
pushing their student-athletes to pursue majors that interest them.
Clustering diminishes the increased lifetime earnings argument touted by
those against paying student-athletes based on education. How can a
student-athlete “fall back” on a degree if it has no real world value?
Academic cheating scandals regarding player eligibility continue to
come to light. The University of North Carolina was placed on probation
by its accrediting organization in 2011 after evidence of over two hundred
questionable classes materialized (Wikipedia 2018c). Internal
investigations showed evidence of unauthorized grade changes, and a
disproportionate representation of student-athletes enrolled in independent
study classes (Wikipedia 2018c). These independent study classes were

Kilburg: Should Division I College Athletes Receive Compensation 37
structured similarly to Directed Research, but it was alleged that multiple
student-athletes had their semester-long papers written for them by
someone else. The NCAA ruled in 2017 that it could not punish North
Carolina because the classes were not offered exclusively to studentathletes (Tracy 2017). Despite a lack of discipline from the NCAA, the
scandal still raises questions about how seriously some colleges are taking
the education of their student-athletes.
Decreased Interest in College Sports:
Many collegiate sports fans claim that student-athletes amateur status
is a contributing factor to why they prefer to watch college sports over
professional sports. Some opposed to paying student-athletes claim that
they will stop watching college sports if student-athletes are paid. But in
many cases, there is a difference in what people say they will consume,
and what they actually consume. The number of fans who stop watching
college sports could also be offset by an increase in viewership from those
who prefer to watch professional sports.
Now that I’ve addressed both sides of the argument, I will provide my
own opinion about student-athletes’ amateur status.

XVI. Analysis
Compelling arguments can be made concerning both sides of the
amateurism debate. It is important to point out that many of the arguments
on both sides are opinionated, and that the full impact of paying studentathletes could not be known for sure unless a formal change were
implemented by the NCAA. There is no question that some elite studentathletes are receiving far less money than they would be worth in a
competitive market. Economists have estimated the value of these star
student-athletes to be far greater than the value of the scholarship they
receive. Despite this, I do not believe colleges should compensate studentathletes in excess of their athletic scholarships. The number of studentathletes financially exploited by the NCAA represent a small fraction of
those competing in Division I sports. The majority of student-athletes
receiving athletic scholarships compete in conferences that are
unprofitable and in sports that lack the popularity of men’s football and
basketball. These student-athletes are receiving more benefits from their
scholarships than they bring in to their colleges.
Student-athletes are given scholarships that cover tuition, the cost of
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food, transportation, and living expenses. Student-athletes are also given
an opportunity to pursue a degree that has the potential to benefit them
long after their athletic careers are over. Clustering and academic scandals
have made some question the quality of education provided to some
student-athletes. Despite this, I believe that most colleges take the
education of their student-athletes very seriously. Colleges provide these
student-athletes with tutors and other resources that will help them
succeed. Student-athletes have the ability to choose their own majors and
are the ultimate drivers that determine how much they take away from
their college experience. I cannot attest to the academic challenges that
come along with being a student-athlete, but the value of a chance to earn
a degree and potentially raise future earnings without acquiring debt is
hard for me to ignore.
Elite student-athletes with aspirations to make it in professional sports
benefit immensely from the training provided to them by colleges. These
student-athletes are given access to the finest facilities in the nation, and
receive guidance from coaches at the highest level of their sport. Studentathletes can access top-notch weight rooms and practice courts at almost
any time. Unlimited meals and professional strength coaches give studentathletes resources that help them strengthen their bodies. Coaches
constantly give advice to student-athletes and help them find ways to
improve their game. It would be very difficult for most student-athletes to
develop into players capable of competing at the professional level without
the resources provided to them by colleges. These student-athletes also
benefit from the ability to compete in front of professional scouts. Many
student-athletes would not be noticed by professional sports leagues if they
decided not to compete in the NCAA. The free training and exposure are
reasons why student-athletes decide to compete in college instead of
pursuing other options.
The Title IX law is a big reason why I am against paying studentathletes. The profits brought in to Power 5 conferences through men’s
basketball and football are often large enough to justify payments to
student-athletes in these sports. However, many of the schools from Power
5 conferences would not have the funds necessary to compensate studentathletes in all sports. Colleges could attempt to compensate studentathletes by reorganizing their athletic department budgets and reducing
coaches salaries, but I’m uncertain how likely it would be for colleges to
use this strategy. Colleges without the necessary funds to pay studentathletes may begin to eliminate non-revenue sports or increase their
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student fees and university subsidies. This approach would siphon more
money away from education, cause students to acquire more debt, and
harm student-athletes competing in unprofitable sports.
The profit margins of the top twenty four major colleges do not
represent the margins of the majority of colleges competing in Division I
athletics. There are 179,200 student-athletes competing for 351 colleges
around the United States (NCAA 2018a). Almost all of the colleges
competing at the Division I level are struggling to break even, or losing
money on athletics. If every Division I student-athlete received just $5,000
a year from colleges on top of their scholarship, it would add
$896,000,000 to nationwide athletic expenditures, or an average of
$2,552,706 per school. Athletic Departments from most colleges would
have a difficult time justifying payments to student-athletes when their
program is already operating at a deficit.
It would not be equitable for Division I colleges to compensate all
student-athletes in excess of their scholarships, but I do believe reform to
NCAA amateurism laws are needed to allow elite student-athletes to
monetize their value. Estimating the number of student-athletes who are
hurt by NCAA price fixing is a difficult task, even among a roster of
student-athletes competing on the same team. The star player on a Division
I basketball team is far more valuable to his college than his teammate
grabbing water bottles at the end of the bench. Because of this, I believe
that it would be very difficult for the NCAA to come up with a system that
compensates all players. Instead of creating a system that directly pays
student-athletes, the NCAA should reform its amateurism rules and allow
student-athletes to accept endorsement deals without losing their
eligibility. This system would allow the best players who are being
exploited to earn a wage closer to their true value, without costing colleges
any additional money. Student-athletes are the only class of people on
campus who have their talents financially restricted. Students in other
organizations are allowed to apply their talents to any profession they
choose. For example, a student on full scholarship in a music program is
allowed to profit by performing at shows or signing with record labels
without any penalty. Why should student-athletes be banned from cashing
in on their skills when non-athletes who receive similar benefits are
allowed to do so?
Here is a list of some things that the NCAA currently restricts that I
would like to see modified.
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Amateurism Regulations

Analysis

Student-athletes are not eligible in
any sport if, after you become a
student athlete, you accept any pay
for promoting a commercial product
or service or allow your name or
picture to be used for promoting a
commercial product or service.
(Bylaw 12.5.2.1)

Student-athletes should be allowed to profit
from appearances in commercials that promote
various products or services.

Student-athletes are not eligible in
any sport if, because of your athletics
ability, you were paid for work you
did not perform, were paid at a rate
higher than the going rate or were
paid for the value an employer
placed on your reputation, fame or
personal following (Bylaw 12.4)

Student-athletes should not be paid for work
they didn’t perform at unfair wages. However
student-athletes should be allowed to be paid
based on the personal following they have
gained from their athletic gifts. For example,
the NCAA currently bans student-athletes
from receiving money for signing autographs;
this is a restriction I would like to see
changed.

Financial Aid Regulations
Student-athletes must report to their
institution, any financial aid that they
receive from a source other than your
institution. However, you do not
need to report financial aid received
from anyone
whom you are naturally or legally
dependent (Bylaw 15.01)

No changes needed. Student-athletes should
continue to receive the financial aid provided
to them by institutions through their
scholarships and should be required to report
the new endorsement deals they sign to the
NCAA.

Academic Standards
No changes needed. The NCAA should keep
the current academic standards in place to
promote academic success among studentathletes. I will discuss how the NCAA may be
able to use endorsements to incentivize
student-athletes to graduate later in my
analysis.
Source: (NCAA 2012)
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The easiest way the NCAA could allow student-athletes to earn money
throughout their college careers is by allowing student-athletes to profit
from existing apparel contracts that are already in place for their practice
equipment and uniforms. The majority of Division I schools have apparel
contracts that could serve as sources of revenue for student-athletes.
UCLA and Under Armour are currently in the middle of a 15 year, $280
million apparel deal (ESPN 2017). Despite the allure of this option, it
would be very difficult for colleges to restructure their apparel contracts
and determine what share student-athletes should receive. For this reason,
it would be better for the NCAA to allow local endorsements so that
competitive markets can determine a student-athlete’s value.
Allowing student-athletes to accept endorsements would cause some
student-athletes to stay in school longer because they would be allowed to
earn real money for their time spent in college. Star players staying in
college longer might increase interest and the revenue earned by their
athletic programs. One common argument against the compensation of
collegiate athletes is that it would take the focus off the ‘student’ aspect
of being a ‘student-athlete,’ and that many students would lose dedication
to their education. In order to promote the “student” aspect of
intercollegiate athletics, the money earned from endorsements by studentathletes could be placed into a trust fund similar to a 401k (Sallee 2018).
The trust fund could be accessed tax free after a student-athlete graduates
from college. If a student-athlete wanted to access the money before they
graduate, it could be taxed similarly to how the federal government taxes
early withdrawals of 401ks. This system would encourage student-athletes
to focus on academics and push them to graduate instead of leaving
college early. The NCAA could use its current enforcement system to
monitor transactions. The trust funds could be managed by any of the
NCAA’s financial partners and student-athletes could be given the
freedom to adjust their trusts in any way they choose as long as the money
is not withdrawn until after graduation. This system could reinforce
clustering and cause player’s to cheat to remain eligible, but these
consequences are nothing new.
It’s undeniable that allowing student-athletes to accept endorsements
would create recruiting advantages for wealthier colleges. Coaches from
Power 5 conferences could say things like, “If you go to that Sun Belt
school there's a pizza place that might sign you to a $10,000 endorsement
deal. But there's a $50,000 endorsement deal with a sporting goods store
available if you sign with us.” This means that the powerful colleges with
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the biggest budgets would have advantages over smaller colleges when
signing recruits. This wouldn’t change things significantly, as this is
already how recruiting in football and men’s basketball operates. Top
recruits often choose to go to the more profitable colleges because they
provide them with the best facilities and training. The competitive balance
in these sports wouldn’t change much if endorsements were made, but
there would be a clearer view about why recruits choose different colleges.
Allowing student-athletes to sign endorsements is a concept that may
not be as improbable as you might think. NCAA president Mark Emmert
said this when asked by the Associated Press about possible reform:
"There's a lot of discussion about the Olympic model, and I think it's well
deserving of serious consideration inside the context of college sports”
(Sallee 2018). The “Olympic model” addressed by the NCAA president is
similar to the model I’ve discussed. Olympians are allowed to secure
endorsement deals and get paid for signing autographs while maintaining
their status as amateurs. Emmert’s comments come in response to growing
pressure for change put on the NCAA by student-athletes and professional
sports leagues like the NBA.
The NCAA currently serves as a free developmental league for
professional sports leagues. If the NCAA decided to revert back to its
original system of pure amateurism with no athletic scholarships offered
to student-athletes, the professional sports leagues would be forced to
create their own minor league systems. Despite a lack of change from the
NCAA, ongoing FBI investigations into college basketball recruiting
scandals have caused the NBA and other leagues to revisit their approach
to how they develop amateur players. NBA commissioner Adam Silver
said this when asked about corruption in college basketball;
A plan is expected to include the NBA starting relationships with
elite teenagers while they are in high school, providing skills to
help them develop both on and off the court. It would ultimately
open an alternate path to the NBA besides playing in college and
a way 18-year-olds could earn a meaningful salary either from
NBA teams or as part of an enhanced option in the developmental
G League (Sharp 2018).
The changes proposed by the commissioner may have a significant impact
on college basketball in the future. Elite NBA-level players who formerly
attended basketball powerhouses like Kentucky may decide to sign directly
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with the NBA development league to earn a salary. The NBA currently
allows players to go straight to the G-League out of high school, but
players are not eligible for the NBA draft until they are 19 years old and
a year removed from high school graduation (Cato 2018). Darius Bazley,
a 5-star recruit currently projected as a top-10 pick in the 2019 NBA draft,
became the first high school athlete to skip college for the G League since
2009, after he decommitted from Syracuse in March (Cato 2018).
Two new developmental football leagues have also been announced
this year that are set to open in 2019 (Alliance of American Football
League) and 2020 (XFL). Salary amounts for players have not been
announced, but both leagues have branded themselves as developmental
leagues designed to help players make it to the NFL. The new leagues
could draw elite football players away from participating in college
football. I believe that some top players will decide to compete in these
leagues and earn a salary if they don’t want to go to college, but the overall
impact these leagues may have on the future of college athletics is difficult
to assess. The NCAA will face increased competition for its studentathletes that may force it to make significant changes. Allowing studentathletes to accept endorsements in addition to their scholarships may be
enough to ward off the competition for potential college stars.

XIX. Conclusion
NCAA revenues continue to skyrocket as television deals and apparel
contracts flood into Division I colleges. The large disparity in profits
produced by various conferences and sports outside of football and men’s
basketball make it very difficult to justify compensating all Division I
student-athletes in excess of their scholarships. Regardless, the
exploitation of elite student-athletes who receive far less in benefits than
they bring in to colleges must come to an end. Instead of increasing
student fees and university subsidies to raise money for student-athlete
salaries, the NCAA should allow student-athletes to profit from their
name, image and likeness through endorsements and other forms of
compensation. This system would allow student-athletes to earn money
while pursuing a degree and competing in the sport they love. There is no
perfect solution to the issues within the NCAA, but allowing studentathletes to accept endorsements is a possible method that could help
student-athletes earn a more fair wage.
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